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Summary
The Navy is implementing or experimenting with new kinds of naval formations,
more flexible forward-deployment schedules, forward-homeporting additional Navy
ships, and long-duration deployments with crew rotation (which the Navy calls Sea
Swap).  These changes, which form a key part of Navy transformation, raise several
potential issues for Congress.  This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
As part of its transformation efforts,1 the Navy is implementing or experimenting
with new methods for deploying its ships overseas, including new kinds of naval
formations, more flexible deployment schedules, homeporting additional Navy ships at
forward locations, and long-duration deployments with crew rotation.  Each of these
changes is discussed below.
New Kinds Of Naval Formations.  The Navy previously organized itself into
aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs).  An ARG
typically included 3 amphibious ships that together were capable of embarking a Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which is a force of about 2,200 Marines, their ground-combat
equipment, and an aircraft detachment.  ARGs traditionally operated overseas in the
company of CVBGs.  Navy officials believe this way of organizing the Navy no longer
offers sufficient flexibility for responding to the potential need for deploying significant
naval capability in several locations around the world at the same time.  Navy officials
also believe that with the increasing capabilities of Navy ships, naval formations other
than the large CVBG/ARG combination can now be sufficient to perform certain
missions.
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As a result, the Navy has implemented a new Global Concept of Operations
(CONOPS) that reorganizes the Navy into a larger number of independently deployable,
strike-capable formations.  The most significant change under the plan is the conversion
of ARGs into independently deployable formations called Expeditionary Strike Groups
(ESGs).  An ESG is an ARG that has been reinforced with 3 surface combatants and an
attack submarine carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles, and perhaps a land-based P-3 Orion
long-range maritime patrol aircraft.  The Global CONOPS also creates independently
deployable surface strike groups (SSGs), each consisting of a few surface combatants
(most or all Tomahawk-armed), and independent operations by 4 Trident SSGN
submarines that have been converted to carry Tomahawks and special operations forces.
CVBGs under the Global CONOPS plan have been redesignated Carrier Strike Groups
(CSGs).  Implementing the Global CONOPS has changed the Navy from a fleet with 12
independently deployable CVBG/ARG formations into one with 20 major independently
deployable strike groups (11 CSGs and 9 ESGs) and additional independently deployable
capabilities in the form of SSGs and Trident SSGNs.
More Flexible Forward-Deployment Schedules.  The Navy’s traditional
means of maintaining forward-deployed presence had been the standard six-month
deployment.  Although the six-month limit on deployment length and the predictability
of the rotational deployment schedule were considered key to the Navy’s ability to
maintain its forward deployments while meeting its personnel recruiting and retention
goals, Navy officials concluded that the deterrent value of forward-deployed naval forces
might be enhanced by making naval forward deployments more flexible and less
predictable.  Navy officials have also concluded that orienting Navy readiness toward
maintaining standard six-month deployments resulted in a fleet that offered insufficient
flexibility for responding to the potential need for surging large numbers of naval forces
in a short time to respond to major regional contingencies. 
As a result, although six-month deployments will still take place, the Navy has put
more flexibility into its deployment plans by deploying some CSGs and ESGs for less
than or more than six months, as operational needs dictate.  In addition, the Navy has
implemented a new Fleet Response Plan (FRP) to increase the Navy’s ability to surge
multiple formations in response to emergencies.  Under the FRP, CSGs and ESGs that
have just returned from deployments will be kept, for a time, on alert for potential short-
notice redeployment if needed, and CSGs and ESGs that are approaching their next
scheduled deployment will be maintained in a higher readiness status so that they, too,
could be deployed on short notice.  Implementing the FRP with 11 CSGs, Navy officials
say, permits the Navy to deploy up to 6 CSGs within 30 days, and an additional CSG
within another 60 days after that.  For this reason, the FRP is also referred to as “6+1.”
In June 2004, the General Accounting Office, or GAO (which in July 2004 was renamed
the Government Accountability Office) reported that the FRP
does not shorten preexisting time frames for performing aircraft carrier maintenance.
Furthermore, it does not alter existing major repair and maintenance requirements;
methods of upgrading and modernizing weapons, communications, and engineering
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systems; or methods of performing nuclear refueling. At this time, the potential impact
of the plan on the Navy’s budget is uncertain.2
In November 2005, GAO reported that
the Navy’s management approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan has not
fully incorporated sound management practices needed to guide and assess
implementation....  Sound management practices were not fully developed because
senior leaders wanted to quickly implement the plan in response to changes in the
security environment. However, without an overall management plan containing all
of these elements, it may be difficult for the Navy to determine whether its efforts to
improve the fleet’s readiness are achieving the desired results, adequately measuring
overall progress, or identifying what resources are needed to implement the Fleet
Response Plan.
The Navy has not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or
developed lessons learned to identify the effectiveness of its implementation and
success over time.... instead of methodically conducting realistic tests to evaluate the
Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has tried to demonstrate the viability of the plan by
relying on loosely linked events that were not part of an overall test and evaluation
strategy. This approach could impair the Navy’s ability to validate the plan and
evaluate its success over time. In addition, the Navy has not used its lessons learned
system to share the results of its Fleet Response Plan events or as an analytical tool
to evaluate the progress of the plan and improve implementation, which limits the
Navy’s ability to identify and correct weaknesses across the fleet.3
Forward-Homeporting Additional Ships.  Homeporting Navy ships in
overseas locations, called forward homeporting, can reduce transit times from home port
to operating area and thus permit a Navy of a certain size to provide a larger number of
ship days on station in overseas operating areas.  The U.S. Navy’s principal forward
homeporting location is Japan, where the Navy since the early 1970s has forward
homeported a CVBG and ARG.  The Navy traditionally has also forward-homeported a
small number of other ships, such as fleet command ships and repair ships, in forward
locations such as Italy and the U.S. territory of Guam.
The Navy in recent years has forward-homeported fur mine warfare ships at Bahrain
in the Persian Gulf and three attack submarines at Guam.  The Navy has studied the idea
of homeporting an aircraft carrier and additional attack submarines at Hawaii or Guam.
A March 2002 CBO report presented an option for homeporting as many as 11 attack
submarines at Guam.4  The final report of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
directs the Navy to provide at least six aircraft carriers and 60% of its submarines in the
Pacific.  Increasing the number of ships forward-homeported in the Pacific can improve
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the Navy’s ability to respond to contingencies in locations such as the Korean Peninsula
or the Taiwan Strait.5
Long-Duration Deployments With Crew Rotation.  As a potential fourth
change, the Navy has experimented with the concept of long-duration deployments with
crew rotation.  This concept, which the Navy calls Sea Swap, is another way  to reduce
the amount of time that deployed ships spend transiting to and from operating areas.  It
involves deploying Navy ships overseas for periods such as 12, 18, or 24 months rather
than 6 months, and rotating successive crews out to the ships for 6-month periods of duty.
Sea Swap can reduce the number of ships the Navy needs to have in its inventory to
maintain one such ship on station in an overseas operating area by 20% or more.
Potential disadvantages of Sea Swap include extensive wear and tear on the deployed ship
due to lengthy periods of time at sea, a reduced sense of crew “ownership” of a given ship
(which might reduce a crew’s incentive to keep the ship in good condition), and reduced
opportunities for transit port calls (which have diplomatic value and are beneficial for
recruiting and retention).
The Navy in recent years has conducted Sea Swap experiments with surface
combatants and mine warfare ships.  Navy officials have characterized the experiments
successful in terms of ship days on station, total costs, ship maintenance and material
condition, and crew re-enlistment rates during deployment.  In July and August 2004, it
was reported that a review of the Sea Swap experiment conducted by the Center for Naval
Analyses found that although Sea Swap was successful in these terms, crew members
participating in the experiment who were surveyed viewed the concept negatively and
indicated they would be less likely to stay in the Navy if all deployments were conducted
this way.  The Navy made changes in later Sea Swap experiments to address issues that
led to crew dissatisfaction, including lost liberty calls and increased training and work.
Navy officials at one time expressed interest in extending the Sea Swap concept to
other types of ships.  In 2005, Navy officials testified that applying Sea Swap somewhat
widely throughout the fleet could help permit the fleet to be reduced from a range of 290
to 375 ships down to a range of 260 to 325 ships.6  More recently, however, Navy officials
have expressed less enthusiasm for extending Sea Swap beyond surface combatants.  A
July 2006 press article reported that the Navy may limit Sea Swap to smaller surface
combatants such as patrol craft, Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and frigates.7  A
November 2004 GAO report on Sea Swap concept concluded the following:
To effectively institutionalize and implement change, best practices show that a
comprehensive analytical framework provides useful information to decision makers.
However, the Navy has not established such an analytical framework — consisting
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of formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics — that could be used to assess the
feasibility of various rotational crewing options and determine their impact on
operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale.  Further, the Navy has not
systematically collected or developed accurate cost data to perform complete
cost-effective analyses.  Absent such information, the Navy may not know the full
impact of rotating crews on surface ships, the extent to which the various options
should be implemented, or whether it is getting maximum return on investment.
Because rotating crews on surface ships is evolving as an alternative, the Navy has
not provided effective guidance when implementing the practice and has not
systematically leveraged lessons learned....  While the Navy has well-established crew
rotation policies and procedures for ballistic missile submarines that include appropriately
documenting a ship’s condition and turnover procedures for accountability, it has not
provided comparable guidance to surface ships.  As a result, the Navy unnecessarily risks
repeating mistakes that could decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew morale.
Furthermore, the impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of rotational
crewing has not been fully assessed....  It is a challenge to ensure the mission
capability of ships that are deployed for longer periods because most maintenance and
repair is usually completed between 6-month deployments.  While rotating crews has
enabled the Navy to keep ships deployed for up to 24 months, the service has not fully
examined all issues related to the best maintenance strategies that could affect a ship’s
condition and crew’s morale.  Absent effective strategies, the Navy risks degrading
long-term ship condition and discouraging crew support for rotational crewing.8
Issues For Congress
Potential issues for Congress include the following:
! How have the four changes discussed above affected the planned size and
structure of the fleet?9
! For what kinds of ships should Navy use Sea Swap?
! How will FRP and the forward-homeporting of additional ships affect the
distribution of Navy ship overhaul and repair work?
! How much additional funding will be needed under the FRP to maintain
higher readiness levels for ships?  What other Navy programs might need
to be cut to finance any additional readiness-related expenditures?
! What are the Navy’s intentions regarding the idea of homeporting an
aircraft carrier or additional attack submarines at Hawaii or Guam?
Should the Navy also examine options for forward-homeporting Navy
ships in locations like the Mediterranean and Australia?
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Another potential strategy for increasing the percentage of time that Navy ships can
be deployed is multiple crewing, which would involve maintaining an average of more
than one crew for each Navy ship.  Potential versions include having two crews for each
ship (dual crewing), 3 crews for every 2 ships, 4 crews for every 3 ships, 5 crews for every
4 ships, or other combinations, such as 8 crews for every 5 ships.  The most basic version
of Sea Swap maintains an average of one crew for each ship, but Sea Swap could be
combined with multiple crewing.  For many years, the Navy’s nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs) have been operated successfully with dual crews.  In 1997,
a Navy study panel proposed multiple-crewing for other kinds of ships.  The above-
mentioned March 2002 CBO report presented the option of applying multiple crewing to
the attack submarine fleet.  Potential disadvantages of multiple crewing include the costs
of recruiting, training, and retaining additional crews, the difficulty of achieving fully
realistic training using land-based simulators (whose use would be more necessary
because a given crew would not always have access to a ship for training), a reduced sense
of crew “ownership” of a given ship, and increased wear and tear on the ship due to more
intensive use of the ship at sea (which can reduce ship life).
Legislative Activity
FY2007 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5122/S. 2766).
House.  Section 332 of H.R. 5122 would require a Navy report on several aspects
of the FRP, followed by a GAO review of that report, and would prohibit expansion of
the FRP beyond the Navy’s CSGs until October 1, 2007.  Section 333 would require a
Navy report on several aspects of the Navy’s surface ship rotational crew programs (Sea
Swap), and would prohibit any additional surface ship rotational crew experiments or
program until October 1, 2009.  The House Armed Services Committee, in its report
(H.Rept. 109-452 of May 5, 2006) on H.R. 5122, stated:
The committee has concerns regarding expansion of the Fleet Response Plan to
other ships beyond those in a carrier strike group.  The committee notes the Navy has
neither fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan nor formally implemented
the required operational, training and personnel directives to manage this program....
The committee is concerned about the expansion of the surface ship rotation
crew program formally known as Sea Swap to other surface ships.  Potential
disadvantages of Sea Swap include extensive wear and tear on the deployed ship due
to a lengthy period of time at sea, reduced sense of crew ownership of a given ship,
reduced opportunities for transit port calls and a negative impact on crew morale and
retention.  (Pages 301-302)
Senate.  The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 109-254 of
May 9, 2006) on S. 2766, stated:
In certain cases, the success of the Fleet Response Plan relies on the timeliness of the
decision to surge-deploy the naval forces, and with smaller force levels and reduced
forward presence, the Fleet Response Plan approach may increase risk if we do not
have the level of insight into the threat necessary for timely action.  (Page 380)
